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One of tha areas of American life wlure a unique Church-State entente has 
continued in an unchallenged and indeed in an almost unnoticed way is the very substantial 
financial assistance which Church-re lated social welfare agencies rece ive from Federal and 
state sources. There ap~ars to be little if any public opinion that would challenge the 
right of the state to care for the aged, the sick, the de linquent and the handicapped 
through instrumentalities which are re ligiously affiliated. 
For a variety of reasons the private or sectdrian social service agency has 
a juridical status never granted or attained by the private or sectarian el..~mentary or 
secondary school .. The reasons why the American government, in carrying out many of its 
obligations to its citizens in a modern ''we Ifare state" habitually and without controversy 
employs denominatiDnal agencies need not be elaborated here. But the uniqueness of the 
re lationship of the American state to Church-sponsored social welfare a~ncies should be 
emphasized and remembared if one desires to develop a rationale for the employment by 
these agencies of religion as a standard of action 0 
The fundamental reason for the widespread "purchase of services" arrangements 
with Church-connected agencies is probably simply the mere existence of these units at 
tha time when American government moved dramatically into the field of financing new 
programs for the socially disadvantaged. Actually it was in large part the inspiration and 
example of sectarian senre,menthou5es and similar social agencies which prompted the 
American government to commit itse If a generation or two ago to bring social justice to the 
deprived and to the disadvantaged. And it was the withering away of the philanthropic 
support for social welfare agencies which produced governmental financing at all bve Is for 
agencies hitherto private Iy endowed and hence maintained without tax 5upport. 
8.,;}cause of the origin and nature of social welfare agencies in America 
religious factors have always baan promi~nt, --and to some extent predominant, -- in the 
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manner in which t~sa a~ncies havs bestowed assistance on those who hava corre under 
their care. In tha casa of placing childran for fostar care or for adoption the influences 
of the $ectarian origins of Amarica's child-placing agancias have ~come visible in the 
placement-adoption pattarn according to which a child is ordinarily pla.ced in a home of the 
religious faith of th~ natural mother of tha child, -- or, in soma few casas, in a home with 
the religion of the natural father or other guardian of the child. This practice has been 
copied by stata-related public welfare agancies and has, in fact, bacorre a legal 
requirem~nt in some thirty states. 13t us try to explore and analyze the issues in this 
recently emerg;Jd and wide Iy misunderstood area. 
THe LAW AND SOCIAL Wi. LFARi. AGENCieS 
Most social workers and infarmed obsarverswould agree that, in the ideal 
oroor, the stata should impose as little regulation as possible on social we Ifare agencias. 
Social workers having a right to the same professional freedom to act on the ir best judgment 
as do lawyers, medical doctors or members of any other highly trained and state-licensed 
profession ~ This freedom should not be diminished for social workers who are employed by 
public, tax-supported agendas. 
To what extant therefore should tha state regulate the process of adoption? 
Since adoption is basically the creation of a lagal relationship it is clear that some type of 
juridical process is needed in order to provide those lagal formalities which are sufficient to 
creata for all time t~ status and rights of an adopted person 10 But beyond the minimum 
requirements of such a law sound public policy would seem to suggest that all other principbs 
and practices with respect to the best way to arrange adoptions should be left to persons 
who, by training and experience, are far better equipped to arrange successful adoptions 
than are legislators or iudges. 
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It is consequently something of an anomaly that the 
laws of a majority of our states regulate and restrict the fr~~dom of social workars and 
w~lfare a9'3ncies with regard to place~nts with adopting parents of a different r~ligious 
faith than the faith of the natural mother or of the childo In the ideal order it would 
probably be ootter if such a matter did not havs to be regulated by statut~s. The existence 
of such statutes, however, may suggest that the state f~e Is fhat there is substant ia I and 
avan a constitutional right involved in this area and that such a right deserves and demands 
the protection of a statute. 
Very little serious thought has be~n giv.N) to the underlying purposes of the 
so-called religious protection statutes now in effect in states where possibly 75% of all the 
nation's adoptions take place 0 Court decisions in which these statutes are co~trued prove 
little about the jurisprudential concapts on which tooy are based. Despite the theoretical 
objections to the vary existence of these laws and Q;spite the continuing and even the 
deepening ambiguity concerning their purposes these statutes seem to reflect the policies 
which are endorsed by knowled9'3able social workers who, it appears, would not recomrrund 
their rapeal. 
Assuming ther~fore that various state laws requiring, wh3rever practicable, 
the matching of tlla religious faith of the child with the faith of his adopting parents 
represent sound social work principles how con we analyze the rights which these statutes 
are desigood to safeguard? 
This paper will attempt to defend the following propositions: 
1. Re ligious protection statutes are designed primarily to safeguard 
the right of the natural mother of a child to transmit her religion to 
her child, -- a right which may eventually coma within the 
protection of the free exercise of re ligion guarantee of the 
First Amendment of the Federal Constitution 0 
2. The religion of the natural mother (or of both parents) 
may sorretirrus be so much a part of a child's life that an 
adoptable child may have aright to legal protection of its 
own inchoata raligious identity" 
3. Couples petitioning for adoption acquire a right to become 
adopting parents if thair qualifications are superior to other 
prospectiva parents within the sarre general community. 
Whatever rights adopting parents may acquire, however, are 
subiect to the prior right of the natural mother of an 
adoptable child to transmit har religious faith to her own child. 
1. THE RIGHT OF A MOTHER TO TRANSMIT HER RELIGIOUS FAITH TO HER CHILD 
All temporary or permanent placem3nts of children are made, of course, 
pursuant to too cardinal principle that the we Ifara of the ch ild shall be controlling. In 
most casas it could be expectad that the best interests of the child coincide with the bast 
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aspirations of the child's mother. Any parent who is required by circumstances to surrender 
a child for adoption would desire that the child acquire a homa where all possible benefits 
would be available. 
In the avent, however, of a conflict between the wishes of a natural mother 
and the judgment of an adoption agency with regard to what is in the bast interests of the 
ch ild the wishes of the mother race ive priority in only one area -- the choice of re ligion 
for the child. This priority, however, is not an "absolute /I since, according to sound social 
work principlas and the law of ~the states, the welfare of the child must receive top 
priority, -- includi ng priority over the right of a mother to control the future re I igion of the 
child she surrenders for adoption. 
, 
The origin of the law which extends juridical protection to the ra ligion of a 
ch ild is attributable at least in part to the basic tradition of Anglo-American law that, in the 
event of the death or diwbility of a chiid's natural parents, the child's religion is pr,asumed 
to ~ that of his father if the child was born in wedlock and that of his mother if the child 
was born out of wedlock. This presumption graw out of the sacrad reverance which Anglo-
American law has always had for t~ intentions of decaased parents with respect to the 
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upbringing of their chi Idren. In the absence of any explicit directives concerning the 
re tigion of orphaned children the law of england and of America has operated on the rebuttable 
presumption that parents would desire to have their children roiS3d in that re ligion in which 
the parents b3lieved. 
It was this presumption which has been carried over into procedures regulating 
the placement of children for foster care ar for adoption. Since placements for adoption 
are obviously more important than temporary placements for foster care it seams appropriate 
to concentrate our discussion on adoptions. 
The well-sattled legal rule that the religion of an adoptable child follows that 
of its mother has been challenged in the recent past as a practice which aids re ligion and 
is therefore a violation of the estabHshrrunt clausa of the First Amendment. No court has 
ever agreed with this contention although, in the few cases on this point which have reached 
appe lIata tribunals, collateral issues such as the presence of a "grey-market" adoption may 
have been the de term iniiig factor in the Couit's daci~i6ns. 
If those who contend that the state may not recognize or designate a child's 
. 
religion are correct in their interpretation of the First Amendment it would appear that 
all American lows which impute the religion of the parents to on orphan are unconstitutional. 
Such an aid to ra ligion would be constitutionally forbidden, -- even if it were very dear 
from the religious activities of deceased porents of minor children that the~ parents 
would be vehemently opposed to their children being brought up in a religious faith different 
from the ir own. 
This no-aid-to-re ligion interpretation of the establishment clouse fails to 
balance this mandate with the equally binding mandate in the sama Arrendment which 
prohibits stote infringement on the free exercise of religion. Statutes, court decisions and 
customs which impute the religion of deceased parents to their minor children are based on 
the common assumption that the religious faith to which a person adheres is ore of his most 
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precious pos~ssions and that we may sably assume that he would want it transmitted to his 
child •• 
This same ty~ of reasoning underlies the universal practice of social we I fare 
agencies and tha law of the majority of our states in their policy of allowing a mother, in 
surrendering her child for adoption by another, to designate the re ligion of the child. If 
one argues that the Federal Constitution prohibits the law from arranging or even allowing 
a practice he is in effect taking the position that the Catholic, Protastant or Jewish unwed 
mother who surrenders her child must live forever with the anguish of not knowing whether 
the child of her own flesh has received that religion and those spiritual values which to 
a religious mother would be as valuable and worth transmitting as life itself. 
Many persons -- perhaps most -- would not go to this point of denying ~ 
power to the state to ragulate the religion of an adoptable child. Some individuals would 
urge rather that the natural mother, at th! time of her surrender, affirmative Iy designate 
the religion in which she desires her child to be raisad. If such designation in writing were 
completely voluntary, made in the absence of any pressure and without knowledge of the 
existence of potential adopting parents it would generally be a trustworthy document. Any 
variance between the actual faith of the mother and the faith designated for the child 
could be investigated by appropriate questioning by experienced counse lIors 0 If a valid 
reason 3xisted why a mother desired a faith for her child different than her own she should 
be entitled to have this desire carried into practice. 
If, however I there are circumstances -- within or I more particularly, outs ida 
of an approved social we Ifer3 agency •. - which tand to influenca Cl mother surrendering her 
child to select or to permit the selecHon of a faith for her child different' than her own one 
may wonoor whether such a mother was in a condition or in circumstances which o!1owed her 
to make a choice that was truly voluntary, In unregulated or third-party adoptions i'he 
possibilities of undue influence on the mothers of adoptable children to alter the re ligion of 
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th~ it child are clearly apparent. It is also apparent on the other hand that in carefu Ily 
regulated agency adoptions there may 00 subtle pressure on surrendering mothers not to 
change the faith of their children from that religion which the mother herself professes. 
The rule therefore should be to 3xtend to the natural mother who has 
decided to surrender har child for adoption an atmosphere of the fullest possible freedom 
in wh ich she can mak~ her decision in a complete Iy voluntary way. It seems e lamental 
that a mother has this right. If social work practices and statutory law presume that her choice 
of the child's religion will be that religious faith to which she herself adheres such pra-
sumption is made only to assist moth~rs who for understandable reasons are hardly in the 
best position to make a d3cision ~sed on entirely rational factors. 
Social welfare agencies therefore as well as tribunals which must approve 
of proposed adoptions should recognIze the following principles: 
1. The right of a natural mot her to designata the religion of the child she 
surrenders for adoption is firmly grounded in Anglo-American law. It is 
based on a profound respect for the rights of parents and a de~p concern for 
the free exercise of religion guaranteed in the first Amendment. 
2. The impiamentation by the state of such a right does not give aid to 
religion in a way forbidden by the establishment clause. 
3. The designation by a mother of the religi on of her child should, 
whenever possible, be eX3cuted in an orderly and affirmative way 
so that the mother is assured of procedural due process in making her choice. 
II. DO CHILDReN HAVE ANY INHERENT RIGHT TO Bf PLACED WITH A FAMilY 
OF A PART ICU LAR RE L1G ION? 
It would appear that if mothers surrendering their children were given the 
procedures outlined above there would be no need of even discussing our second question • 
.-
In all too many cases, however, there is no orderly way of permitting a mother to choose the 
religion of her adoptable child. In many other cases, furthermore, the mother has no 
religious commitment and hence does not affirmatively desire any particular religion for 
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her child. In such cases do childr.;;}n hava any inherent right to be classified as members or 
inchoata members of a particu lar r~ ligion? 
This question would not arise if parents and/or social w~Jfare agencies 
extended to mothers of adoptable children the option of be ing Catholic, Protestant, 
Jewish or NONE. If this were don~ the mother whose religion was "nork!" would 
presumably include her child in the same category and her parental wishes would be binding, 
-- assuming that the agency could locate suitable parents whose re lig;on was also IInone." 
There is little if any law on the question whether a child has the right to 
inherit or otherwise to acquire the religion of his parents or ancestors. There is developing, 
however, a body of law about the rights of children which is based on the premise that 
children, even while 'Ien ventre sa mere ", have rights which should be cognizable in 
the civi I law. l..agal institutions in America are concerned primarily with the preservation 
of the physicial riches and the financial resources to which some children are heir. But 
the spiritual legacies of adopted children should not be completely bayond the scope of a 
law designed to protect the innocent. 
III. THE RIGHTS OF ADOPTING PARENTS 
The contention has been made repeatedly that some of the children who are 
adopted in America rece ive a less advantageous home because they can be adopted only by 
families of the same religious faith as that of the mother or the child. Whil.e no hard 
information is available on how many adopted children are allegedly disadvantaged by 
a less desirable adopting family because of a religious factor the real question to ponder is 
this: does a mother's right to transmit her religious faith to her child take priority over 
that child's opportunity to obtain an adoptive home which might be materially better if the 
mother were denied the privilege of controlling the religion of her child? 
To put it another way -- should couples petitioning for adoption ba refused 
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childr3n simply bacau~ no available adoptabld children are of the faith th~ concededly most 
qualified would-be adopting parants? Cldarly the answer to this question dapends on the 
reply which one would make to the question concerning the priority which should be given 
to the mother's right to transmit her basic viewpoint on life and eternity to her own child. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The harmonization of the sometimes conflicting rights of the natural mother I 
oor adoptable child and potential adopting parents will never present easily resolvable 
problems. By universal consent and by a strong tradition in Anglo-American law the 
religious faith of the mother about to surrdnder her child for adoption has bean given 
a certain amount of juridical protection. The preservation of that protection should not collide 
with sound social work practices, with any aspect of the Federal constitution or with the 
basic principle that in the placement of children the over-all welfare of the child must be the 
paramount concern of everyone ~ 
